COMMENT
IMPEACHING A DEFENDANT'S TRIAL TESTIMONY
BY PROOF OF POST-ARREST SILENCE
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,1
the government has been required to establish, as a prelude to
introducing in evidence any statement made by a defendant
during custodial interrogation, that prior to making the statement the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent
and of his right to the presence of counsel. In formulating this
prophylactic rule, the Court was attempting to ensure, by a
means less cumbersome than a case-by-case due process inquiry
into voluntariness, 2 that any self-incriminating statement used
against a criminal defendant be the product of his free will folLowing a knowing and intelligent waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Miranda's exclusionary rule was obviously aimed
at protecting the defendant who makes a statement to police:
If the warnings are not given, the statement may not be used as
substantive evidence. But what of the defendant who, warned
of his constitutional rights, makes no statement to police and
declines to respond to police questioning?3 Does he derive any
protection from the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination?
The constitutionality of using post-arrest silence to impeach
a defendant's credibility has been litigated several times in the
2

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); cf. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3 Empirical studies indicate that a significant proportion of arrestees, after receiving the Miranda uarnings. exercise their right to remain silent. The percentages
have varied from 40% in Pittsburgh, Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A
Statistical Study, 29 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1, 13 (1967), to 60% in Washington, D.C., Medalie,
Zeitz & Alexander. Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt
to lImplent Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347. 1372, 1414 (1968); cf. Leiken. Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENVER L.J. 1, 13 (1970). But
c/. Comment, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1563 (1967) (disputing the proposition that \uarnings produced less talking by arrestees than ixould have been the case without the warnings).
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years since Miranda. The results have been diverse. Typically,
the defendant takes the witness stand at his trial and offers an
alibi defense or other exculpatory testimony. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicits that defendant did not tell the exculpatory story to the police when he was arrested. The prosecutor argues in his summation that the jury should disbelieve
defendant's exculpatory trial testimony because, if it were true,
he would have protested the fact to the police when first arrested and charged with the crime.
This problem presents a direct conflict between the fifth
amendment concerns underlying the Court's decision in Griffin
v. California4 and the government's interest in truthful and accurate testimony. The, importance of the latter was recognized
in the impeachment exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule
enunciated in the later decision of Harrisv. New York. 5 The courts
that have faced this issue have not agreed upon the proper
accommodation to be made between the rationales of the two
decisions. Cases in the Third and Fifth Circuits have sanctioned
impeachment use of a defendant's post-arrest silence as a legitimate aid to testing the truthfulness of his trial testimony, 6 while
cases in the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits have proscribed its use as a penalty upon the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege.7 The problem was treated recently in the Third
Circuit case of Agnellino v. New Jersey.8 A sharp division among
the members of the panel resulted in the fullest discussion of
the question to date, and provides a framework for exploring
the reaches of Griffin and Harris.
Consideration will first be given to the Court's decisions in
Griffin and Harris and to the conflicting applications of those
doctrines to the arrest silence issue by the courts of appeals.
Attention will then shift to Agnellino itself and to an examination of the treatment accorded Griffin and Harris by the court
in that case, followed in each instance by a critical analysis of
that treatment. A suggested resolution of the problem of impeachment use of arrest silence will emerge.
4 380 U.S. 609 (1965); see text accompanying notes 9-14 infra.

401 U.S. 222 (1971); see text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.

6 United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414

U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971).
7 United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.), cert. grantedsub nom. United
States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 616 (1974) (No. 74-364); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066
(10th Cir.). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
8493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974).
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BACKGROUND: GRIFFIN,HARRIS, AND
THE IMPEACHMENT DECISIONS

The argument that impeachment use of a defendant's silence
upon arrest violates the fifth amendment is bottomed upon
the Court's decision in Griffin v. California.9 At the trial, the
prosecutor had urged an inference of guilt from Griffin's failure to take the stand. 10 Moreover, the trial court had instructed
the jury that the defendant's failure to deny or explain evidence
which he "can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge" may indicate that "among
the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those
unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.""1 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, articulating this standard:
[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of
the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,'

. . .

which

the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed
by courts for -exercising a constitutional privilege. It
cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion
2

costly.'

The Court's reliance upon the "penalty" rationale to establish
the no-comment rule was a clear departure from traditional
fifth amendment "compulsion" analysis.13 Because the defendant
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
10As early as 1893, the Court held that comment upon a defendant's failure to
testify is reversible error in a federal prosecution. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S.
60 (1893). That holding was based upon a federal statute, now codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3481 (1970), so it provided no precedent for the constitutional holding reached in
Griffin. Prior to Griffin, the Court twice faced the constitutional issue, but did not reach
the question either time because the fifth amendment was not held applicable to the
states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908). In 1964, however, the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment
and that the same fifth amendment standards apply in state as in federal proceedings.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griffin a year later, was thus able to hold the California practice unconstitutional. 380
U.S. at 614-15. Cf. Adamson v. California, supra at 90 (Black, J., dissenting, joined
by Douglas, J.); id. at 124-25 (Murphy, J., dissenting, joined by Rutledge, J.) (would
hold fifth amendment applicable to the California practice); id. at 61 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (implying that the fifth amendment would be applicable but for the
barrier of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence).
"1 380 U.S. at 610. The prosecutor's comment and the court's instruction were
authorized by the California constitution. Id. n.2.
IIId. at 614.
"Justice Stewart dissented:
[T]he Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds . . . . Exactly what the penalty imposed consists of is not
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had neither taken the stand nor given the police a statement
before trial, there was no question of compelled self-incrimination and the decision could not have been justified upon that
basis.' 4 Thus, the Court engrafted onto the fifth amendment
as previously understood the additional proscription that no
inference of guilt be urged from a defendant's assertion of the
privilege at trial.
The initial constitutional challenges to use of a defendant's
silence upon arrest were directed at substantive use of that evidence in the prosecution's case in chief, 15 rather than at the
more limited use of impeaching the credibility of a defendant
who takes the stand in his own defense. The consistent holding
of all courts which have faced the issue has been that such use of
an accused's post-arrest silence as evidence of guilt violates the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 16 Unclear. . . . Since comment by counsel and the court does not compel testimony by creating such an awareness, the Court must be saying that the
California constitutional provision places some other compulsion upon
the defendant to incriminate himself, some compulsion which the Court
does not describe and which I cannot readily perceive.
Id. at 620-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-51,
at 284-95, 315-18 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Graper, The Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Accusation-An Introduction, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 341-43 (1955).
'4See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 700 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV.
56, 159-60 (1965); Note, 70 DICK. L. REV. 98 (1965). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 131, at 275-78 (2d ed. 1972).
' McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928), appears to be the

first in which the issue was raised.
16United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
970 (1973); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
912 (1969); Cockrell v. Oberhauser, 413 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397
U.S. 974 (1970); United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Mullings, 364 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1966); Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338 (5th
Cir. 1955); McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928); cf. United States
ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973) (testimony that defendant exercised his right to counsel upon arrest violates the sixth
amendment). The distance between Griffin and the use of post-arrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt is obviously slight. After 1965, the courts relied explicitly on Griffin. See, e.g., United States v. Kroslack, 426 F.2d 1129, 1130 (7th Cir.
1970); United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), rert. denied, 396 U.S.
912 (1969). Some pre-Griffin cases relied upon a similar line of reasoning. See Helton
v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1955); McCarthy v. United States,
25 F.2d 298. 299 (6th Cir. 1928). Some courts bolstered their holdings by referring
to language from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.7 (1966), that indicated
that the majority in that case considered such use to be unconstitutional:
In accord with our decision today. it is impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under
police custodial interrogation. The prosecutor may not, therefore, use at
trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed the privilege in face of accusa-
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daunted, prosecutors began urging that evidence of silence
upon arrest should nevertheless be admissible on the issue of
credibility when the defendant takes the stand and makes statements "inconsistent" with the prior silence. Prior to 1971, however, the Supreme Court had recognized only a very limited
impeachment exception to the exclusionary rules-and that only
tion. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1,8 (1964) ....
Application of Grifjfin to cases involving use of post-arrest silence as evidence
of guilt can hardly be questioned on logical grounds. In both cases the government
urges the jury to infer guilt from an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The sole distinction-that Griffin involved silence at trial, whereas the latter cases
involved silence upon arrest-does not suggest a difference in result. On the contrary,
an inference of guilt from silence during custodial interrogation, where the procedural
safeguards of a trial are lacking, would be even more tenuous than such an inference
from silence at trial.
The little comment evoked by cases proscribing use of silence as evidence of
guilt has generally been favorable. See Note, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 447 (1955); Note, 10
WASHBURN L.J. 105 (1970). Even those courts which have approved the use of silence
to impeach the testimony of a defendant have supported the prohibition against
its use to establish guilt. The Third and Fifth Circuits, for example, are among jurisdictions holding that a defendant's silence upon arrest is a proper subject for crossexamination and argument when the defendant takes the stand. United States ex
rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973); United
States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). Yet the
law of these circuits is clearly that such silence is constitutionally inadmissible on the
question of guilt. United States ex rel. Smith v. Brierly, 384 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1967);
Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968).
Under certain circumstances, the courts have declined to apply the principle
when the accused was shown not to have been under custodial interrogation at the
time of his silence. Miller v. Cox, 457 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1007 (1972). But see Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968) (testimony
that defendant had asserted fifth amendment privilege in noncustodial confrontation with the owner of goods allegedly stolen by defendant is inadmissible as evidence
of guilt). Similarly, the principle has been unused when the defendant made a statement but omitted certain material elements. United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284,
1286 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cordova, 421 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 941 (1970). The Eighth Circuit appears to have gone even further,
holding that when the defendant maintains total silence at first, but later makes a
statement, the silence can be used against him. United States v. Briddle, 443 F.2d
443, 448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). Some courts have declined to reverse when defense counsel invited the error, United States ex rel. Coffey v. Follette,
423 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g per curiam 310 F. Supp. 946, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
United States v. White, 377 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967),
or failed to make a timely objection to its use, United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093,
1103 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 996 (1971); Laughlin v. United States, 411
F.2d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); Hayes v. United
States, 407 F.2d 189, 194-95 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 395 U.S. 972 (1968). But see
United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 206 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Nolan,
416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969), where the Tenth
Circuit reached the use of silence issue despite lack of contemporaneous objection
below, because it deemed the use of post-arrest silence as evidence of guilt "error
• . . so plain, fundamental, and serious" that it could not be overlooked. The courts

19751

IMPEACHING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY

in the fourth amendment context.17 Although that impeachment doctrine had been extended somewhat by the lower federal
courts,18 the argument for impeachment use of a defendant's

silence upon arrest was rarely successful. There were a few exceptions,' 9 mostly in state courts, but the federal courts generally held constitutionally impermissible the impeachment of
a defendant's exculpatory trial testimony by proof that he had
been silent when arrested.2 0 The courts reasoned that impeachment use was similar to use to show guilt: It placed a penalty
upon the exercise of the right to remain silent.
In 1971, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Harris v. New York, 2 ' applying in the fifth amendment context
a greatly expanded version of the impeachment exception of
Walder v. United States.22 Harris had been charged with making
two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. At trial he
took the stand and denied making one of the sales. He admitted
having made the second sale, but testified that the bag contained
have also refused to reverse where, as a result of an objection, the testimony was
stricken from the record, United States v. Castaldi, 453 F.2d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972), or made the subject of a cautionary instruction to
the jury, Hayes v. United States, 407 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 395 U.S.
972 (1909); Spears v. United States, 281 A.2d 287, 290 (D.C. 1971); Grimes v. State,
280 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1972); Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 549, 202 N.W.2d
406, 412 (1972). In some cases, permitting evidence of or comment upon defendant's
silence was held, in view of other overwhelming evidence of guilt, harmless constitutional error. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353, 360 (10th Cir. 1973); State v.Geter,
108 R.I. 437, 442-43, 276 A.2d 274, 276-77 (1971). See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
None of these cases, however, questioned the rule that the fifth amendment 'is
violated by the use of a defendant's post-arrest assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination as evidence of guilt.
11Valder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), held that a defendant who takes
the stand and in his testimony goes beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crime
charged and makes a "sweeping claim" concerning collateral matters may be impeached by evidence inadmissible under the fourth amendment. The Court was careful to distinguish a prior case, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), where
on direct examination the defendant had not testified in such a manner as to open
the door to the use of the illegally obtained evidence. 347 U.S. at 66.
18See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 909-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 873 (1966); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 378-80 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(both allowing impeachment by unlawfully obtained statements).
19Sharp v. United States, 410 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. People,
172 Colo. 406, 473 P.2d 974 (1970); State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279
(1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); May v. State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Mfiss. 1968).
20 United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United
States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (Ist Cir.
1965); ef. State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968).
21401 U.S. 222 (1971).
22347 U.S. 62 (1954); see note 17 supra.
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only baking powder. On cross-examination the government
was permitted to impeach his testimony by showing that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda was inconsistent with his
trial testimony. Purporting to rely upon Walder, the Court held
that even a statement obtained in violation of Miranda may be
used to impeach a defendant's testimony, provided its trustworthiness "satisfies legal standards. '23 The Court acknowledged
that the impeachment evidence in Walder regarded collateral
matters, whereas the testimony in Harris was related "more directly [to] the crimes charged"; but it saw no "difference in principle" requiring a result contrary to that reached in Walder.2 4
The Court's concluding statement summarized the policy underlying the Harris decision:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. . . Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully
and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more
than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary process....
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's
credibility was appropriately 2 impeached
by use of his
5
earlier conflicting statements.
In the years since Harris,courts have been increasingly willing to allow impeachment use of post-arrest silence. Ramirez
v. United States26 was the first case following Harris to present
the issue to a court of appeals. 27 In Ramirez the defendant had
23

401 U.S. at 224.

24 Id. at 225. The Harris decision

has been the subject of vigorous criticism,
largely because of this sub silentio overruling of the Walder limitation on the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Obsermations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Kent, Harris v.New York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?,
38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357 (1971); 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241 (1971); 24 VAND. L. REV.
843 (1971).
25401 U.S. at 225-26.
26 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
27 Since the decision in Harris, the appellate courts of several states have also
had occasion to decide the impeachment use of silence issue. Most state courts have
held impeachment use of arrest silence to be impermissible. State v. Anderson, 110
Ariz. 238, 517 P.2d 508 (1973); Hines v. People, 497 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1972); People
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been arrested and charged with dealing in heroin. He did not
dispute the factual allegations of the indictment, but raised
the defense of coercion, testifying that he had sold heroin only
because a group of men from Mexico had threatened him with
immediate bodily harm if he refused to cooperate. Government
counsel cross-examined Ramirez regarding his having remained
silent upon arrest, and in dosing argument urged the jury to
disbelieve his testimony because "a man actually under duress
and fearful for his family's safety would have informed the
28
police of such a dangerous situation upon being apprehended.
The Fifth Circuit held that impeachment use of Ramirez's postarrest silence was constitutionally permissible, reasoning that
the "analogy of Harris to the case at hand is inescapable. 2 9 Prior
Fifth Circuit cases which had invoked Griffin's penalty doctrine
to prevent guilt use of post-arrest silence3" were neither distinguished nor cited. The court was apparently content to read
Harris as having resolved any possible objection to impeachment by proof of prior silence.
The issue of impeachment use of silence upon arrest was
raised in a slightly different factual context in United States ex
rel. Burt v. New Jersey.31 Defendant Burt was arrested on a charge
of breaking and entering but, unknown to the police, had been
involved in the shooting of a friend, one Owens, the night before
the arrest. While Burt was in custody on the breaking and entering charge, the police were informed of the shooting and of
Burt's alleged involvement. At his trial for murder, Burt took
the stand and testified that the shooting had been accidentalthe result of an argument and ensuing struggle between Owens
and himself. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked him
v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973) (overruling a line of decisions in the
intermediate appellate courts of Michigan which had permitted impeachment use
of post-arrest silence); State v. Griffin, 120 N.J. Super. 13, 292 A.2d 217, certif
denied, 62 N.J. 73, 299 A.2d 328 (1972). Contra, People v. Queen, 8 Ill. App. 3d 858,
290 N.E.2d 631 (1972); Thomas v. State, 285 So. 2d 148 (Miss. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
44 (1974). In Florida the law is unclear. A pre-Harris case disallowed impeachment
use of post-arrest silence, State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968), but a postHarris case has reversed Galasso "to the extent that [it is] inconsistent with Harris."
State v. Ratherford, 270 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973). It is uncertain at this point whether the court considers banning impeachment use of silence to be inconsistent with Harris.
28 441 F.2d at 954.
29
Id. The soundness of the court's conclusion that Harris controls the impeachment use of silence issue is discussed in text accompanying notes 98-140 infra.
30 Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968); Helton v. United States,
221 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955).
31 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).
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why he had neither sought aid for his wounded friend nor informed anyone of his condition, to which he had no response.
In his summation the prosecutor referred to Burt's failure to
tell anyone what had happened, arguing that if the shooting
had been accidental, Burt would have tried to obtain help for
the injured Owens.
The Third Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that the
cross-examination and argument had not violated the fifth
amendment. The decision was based upon the narrow ground
that Burt's silence was not "in the face of accusation" 3 2-he
was not accused of murder when taken into custody, but of
breaking and entering-so that "the basis for the necessity of
' '3 3
Fifth Amendment protection did not exist in the... situation.
The concurring opinion of two members of the three-judge
panel, however, viewed the facts as raising the issue of comment upon silence in the face of the accusation, because Burt
was in custody at the time the police began to suspect him of
the murder and, at least from that point forward, his failure to
tell police of the accidental shooting was silence "in the face of
accusation. '3 4 The concurring opinion relied upon Harris as
permitting impeachment by proof of a defendant's post-arrest
silence, of "testimony which is contradictory to his earlier silence, ' 35 and found the Griffin penalty doctrine no bar to the
impeachment use of silence because of waiver 36 and lack of
32The distinction derives from the Miranda dictum quoted in note 16 supra.
33 475 F.2d at 236.

34Id. at 237 (Rosenn, J., concurring, joined by Van Dusen, J.). One district court
has read Burt as permitting impeachment use of silence upon arrest only when the
silence was with respect to matters other than the charge against the defendant. United
States v. Holland, 360 F. Supp. 908, 911-12 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir.
1973). See Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 728 (3d Cir. 1974) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring) (would give Burt this same limited reading). But the concurring opinion
in Burt, in which two of the judges on the panel joined, should be read as stating the
law of the case-that impeachment use may be made of a defendant's silence upon
arrest with respect to the crime charged. See Agnellino v. New Jersey, supra at 718-19

(so reading Burt).
3-475 F.2d at 237 (Rosenn, J., concurring).

36 Id. at 238. The concept of waiver relied upon in this context is a curious one,
because it is necessarily a retroactive waiver. The argument is that when defendant
takes the stand he waives the prior assertion of the privilege, made at the time of the
arrest. Some courts have viewed the situation from the opposite perspective and have
argued that to permit the defendant to testify at trial would be to sanction a "partial

waiver" of the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson. 498 F.2d 1038, 1047-48,
1051 (D.C. Cir.) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub norn. United States v. Hale,
95 S. Ct. 616 (1974) (No. 74-364); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1069 (10th Cir.)

(Breitenstein, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). Reliance is placed upon
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), which held that a defendant who takes the
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compulsion. 37
Counterpoised against the holdings of these two circuits is
a Tenth Circuit case, Johnson v. Patterson,38 which was the first
case in the courts of appeals since Harris to disallow impeachment use of post-arrest silence. 3 9 Defendant Johnson stood accused of rape. At his trial he took the stand and testified to the
defense of consent, explaining that the complaining witness
had been caught trying to steal his car and had offered to have
intercourse in return for his promise not to report the attempted
theft. During cross-examination, government counsel elicited
that Johnson had not told this story to police when arrested,
and referred to the silence again in his closing argument. Relying upon Griffin, the Miranda dictum, and its own prior guiltuse cases,40 the court held the use of a defendant's arrest silence
to impeach his trial testimony to be impermissible as a "penalty
on the exercise of a constitutional right. '4 1 The court thought
Harris inapplicable to a situation involving prior silence, as op42
posed to a prior inconsistent statement.
In accord with Johnson is United States v. Anderson,4 3 the most
recent case raising the issue of impeachment use of silence. The
court relied primarily upon the lack of probative value of a destand waives his privilege "completely" and cannot object to cross-examination which
discloses that he had previously asserted the privilege in the face of testimony similar
to that which he now denies. It is doubtful, however, whether this doctrine is viable
today. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418-21 (1957), id. at 425-26 (Black,
J., concurring); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 132, at 281 & n.44. The doctrine
predates the modern era of constitutional criminal procedure and should not be considered to have resolved the conflict between the penalty doctrine and the impeachment exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Cf. note 73 infra.
17 475 F.2d at 239. The argument that impeachment use of silence is not impermissible under Griffin because it does not compel the defendant under traditional
standards misconceives the noncompulsion basis of the Griffin holding. See notes 13-14
supra & accompanying text.
38 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973), noted in 87 HARV.
L. REv. 882 (1974), 33 MD.L. REV. 363 (1973), and 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 381 (1974).
a!'
For state court cases which have disallowed impeachment use of post-arrest
silence, see note 27 supra.
40United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Nolan,
416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); cf. United States v. Julian,
450 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1971).
4'475 F.2d at 1067.
42 Id. at 1068. Judge Breitenstein argued in dissent that a balance should be
struck between the fifth amendment privilege and the policy requiring truthfulness
by a witness-a balance which would permit impeachment use. In his view, Griffin
was "not pertinent because in that case the defendant did not take the stand." Id. at
1069 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
43 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub noin. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct.
616 (1974) (No. 74-364).
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fendant's silence upon arrest in holding impermissible its use
to impeach his trial testimony. Defendant Hale, arrested for
robbery, took the stand at his trial and testified that he had obtained the money found in his possession at the time of his arrest
by cashing his wife's welfare check. On cross-examination the
prosecutor elicited that upon his arrest, Hale had declined to
explain to a police interrogator, who asked the question directly,
where the money had come from. Although the trial judge had
issued a cautionary instruction, 44 the court reversed Hale's conviction, concluding:
The premise underlying Harris is that if a defendant
voluntarily gives statements to the police that contradict his trial testimony those statements are admissible
because they are obviously relevant for assessing credibility. When, however, a defendant is informed that
he has a right to remain silent, and then exercises that
right, there is nothing inconsistent if he subsequently
45
offers exculpatory testimony at trial.
Thus, subsequent to Harris, courts of appeals in four circuits have decided the impeachment use of silence question.
The facts of Ramirez, which permitted impeachment by proof
of silence upon arrest, and those of Johnson and Anderson, which
disallowed it, are indistinguishable. All involved silence after
arrest, and use of that silence to impeach exculpatory testimony
given at that trial. And Burt, on slightly different facts, had also
permitted impeachment by prior silence. There was thus sharp
conflict in the law when Agnellino came before the Third Circuit.
That case presents the most extensive consideration to date of
the respective interests involved in resolving the impeachment
use of silence question. Thus, despite the sharp division among
members of the panel, Agnellino is likely to have a significant
influence upon the final resolution of this important constitutional question. For that reason, this Comment's analysis of impeachment use of post-arrest silence attempts to probe the soundness of the Agnellino resolution of the issue.
"The dissenting opinion, while denying that the cross-examination regarding
prior silence was impermissible, would have held that even if there had been error,
the judge's cautionary instruction to the jury rendered it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1053-54 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1042 (opinion of the court). The court compared the facts in Anderson
to those in Grunewald and concluded, contrary to the result Judge Hunter reached
in Agnellino, see note 128 infra, that the circumstances of post-arrest silence, even
more than those of silence before a grand jury, negate any inconsistency between
the silence and subsequent exculpatory trial testimony. Id. at 1042-43.
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II. AGNELLINO V. NEWJERSEY: A COURT DIVIDED
Attilio Agnellino owned and operated a restaurant which
the police searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a local magistrate. They seized two rolls of stolen carpeting and three stolen
air conditioners. Shortly following his arrest and the rendition
of the Miranda warnings, the police questioned Agnellino regarding the goods found during the search. He replied that he
had purchased the air conditioners for $100 each and had obtained a "good buy" on the carpeting. 4 6 He was not asked and
did not volunteer any further information concerning the circumstances surrounding his acquisition of the merchandise.
At trial, he testified in detail about the circumstances of his purchases. 47 In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor
argued that if the testimony were true, "a normal human being"
would have given a full explanation at the time of arrest. 48 Agnellino's failure to do so raised, in the prosecutor's view, an inference of noncredibility. 49 The trial judge overruled defendant's
objection "that no defendant should be penalized for taking
shelter in his constitutional right to remain silent" and ruled
46 Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1974). A police officer
testified that in reply to the question whether the air conditioners were "hot or
stolen," appellant had stated "[fOor that price I wouldn't be surprised." Agnellino,
though, denied having said this.
47 Agnellino testified that he had purchased the carpeting from an unidentified
interior decorator in Camden and the air conditioners from one Bill Gordon. Bill
Gordon could not be located at the time of the trial, nor, apparently, could the
interior decorator from Camden. Agnellino claimed to have had a receipt for the
air conditioners but was unable to locate it following the police search of his premises.
Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1974).
46 493 F.2d at 715. The prosecutor's full comment was as follows:
Now, you take Mr. Agnellino's story. And you consider the logic of the
story. Start right off the bat the night of the raid, the police come, Lieutenant
King and I forget the number, you may recall it, a number of police officers
are on the scene. They go into this shed.
[S]ay this stuff was coming into your shed and you had three air conditioners and six rolls of rugs. And there's an indication they are looking for
stolen property. Logically what would a normal human being do in that
situation? I know what you would do and you know what I would do. I'd say
wait a minute, let's find Bill Gordon, that's where I got those air conditioners from, let's find the interior decorator in Camden.
Following an objection by defense counsel which was overruled, the prosecutor continued:
So I was saying in assessing Mr. Agnellino, I think you have a right to
say that to yourself. Well, what would a normal human being do when the
police are there? There's a raid going on and the property apparently has
been stolen and it just doesn't ring true, this man if he didn't have some
guilty knowledge wouldn't have done that. And that's what you're looking
for in this case.
Id. at 715-16.
49
1Id. at 716 n.2.
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the prosecutor's argument to be "fair comment. ' 50 Agnellino
was convicted of receiving stolen property, and after exhausting state remedies5 1 sought habeas corpus relief. The district
court denied the writ 5 2 and Agnellino appealed to the Third
upon his arCircuit, arguing that the prosecutor's comment
53
rest silence violated the fifth amendment.
Although the Third Circuit panel was unanimous in finding
no fifth amendment violation, the three judges disagreed on
nearly every material point leading to the affirmance. The initial
disagreement was whether the case in fact raised the issue of
impeachment by proof of defendant's assertion of the privilege.
Judge Hunter, writing the principal opinion, viewed the prosecutor's comment as referring to Agnellino's failure to reveal
to the police the source of the goods, which he saw as a conscious
exercise of the privilege by Agnellino; 54 in his view, the issue
would be squarely raised. Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the
result, thought the comment had been directed at Agnellino's
limited response to police questions-a prior statement, which
differed from his trial testimony "both in the choice of words
and in the details offered. ' 55 Judge Weis, also concurring in the
result, referred to "variations between the tenor" of Agnellino's
arrest "statement" and his trial testimony, 56 and argued that
by responding to police interrogation Agnellino had waived
his right to remain silent. 57 The concurring judges would thus
' 0 Id. at 716.
The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey in an unpublished opinion of September 29, 1971. Letter from Robert
1. Ansell to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 12, 1974. A petition for
certification to the Supreme Court of New Jersey was denied, 59 N.J. 434, 283 A.2d

533 (1971), as was a subsequent petition for certiorari, 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
.2 The writ was denied by the District Court for the District of New Jersey in an
unpublished opinion of October 16, 1972. Letter from Robert I. Ansell to the University
of PennsylvaniaLaw Review, Aug. 12, 1974.

.13 Agnellino also claimed on appeal that the search warrant issued by a magistrate
was not supported by facts sufficient to constitute probable cause. The panel was
unanimous
in rejecting this claim. 493 F.2d at 725-28, 729.
54
1d. at 717-18.

5id. at 729 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Judge Hunter convincingly demonstrated
that even if the trial testimony were inconsistent with Agnellino's brief responses
to police questions in the respects urged by Chief Judge Seitz, the prosecutor's comments would not have been justified: those comments did not refer to the inconsistencies discerned by Chief Judge Seitz, but to what Agnellino did not say upon his
arrest. Id. at 717 & nn.5-6 (opinion of the court).

Id. at 730 (Weis, J., concurring).
• Id. Judge Weis' argument that by responding to initial questions Agnellino
waived his right to remain silent is inconsistent with the pronouncement of Miranda
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have decided the case directly under the Harris prior inconsistent statement rationale, without reaching the issue of impeachment by proof of silence upon arrest.
Because Judge Hunter viewed the facts as raising the issue
of impeachment use of post-arrest silence, Chief Judge Seitz
was motivated to set forth his views upon the issue, although
he did not consider it raised. 5 8 Judge Hunter would have read
Burt as resolving the question in favor of impeachment use of
post-arrest silence under the Harris rationale,5 9 and would have
rested his decision on Burt alone. Chief Judge Seitz, however,
read Burt as allowing impeachment use of silence only when that
silence was not "in face of accusation.16 0 Because of this disagreement over the scope of the Burt holding, Judge Hunter was
moved to set forth a full exposition of his views upon the constitutional questions involved. His opinion is the most complete
discussion to date of the impeachment use of silence upon arrest. Although his analysis is not immune from criticism on
several points-and, it will be submitted, is wrong in one significant respect-it does represent an attempt to reconcile the
conflicting penalty and impeachment doctrines upon a reasoned
basis, which is a refreshing change from the characteristic failure
of some of the previous approaches to the problem to treat material issues. 6 1 The remainder of this Comment is devoted to

a critical analysis of the approach taken by Judge Hunter in
Agnellino. This will be accomplished by outlining his analysis
of the penalty and impeachment issues and by relating to the
analysis of those two issues the treatment they have received in
other recent court of appeals cases, concluding in each instance
with an evaluation of the Agnellino analysis and a suggested resolution of the issues.
that "where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention

that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some
information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated."
Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (footnote omitted).
8 493 F.2d at 728-29 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
"- Id. at 718-19 (opinion of the court); see text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
60493 F.2d at 728 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
62The Court in Ramirez did not address the question whether impeachment use
of silence might not constitute an impermissible penalty under Griffin and prior
Fifth Circuit cases. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. And the court in Johnson
declined to consider whether impeachment use of silence, because of the difference
in the nature of the penalty and because of the asserted state interest in getting truthful testimony, was distinguishable from Griffin and the cases prohibiting guilt use of
silence upon arrest. See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
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THE GRIFFIN "PENALTY" DOCTRINE AS A
BARRIER TO IMPEACHMENT USE OF
SILENCE UPON ARREST

A.

Introduction: The Nature of the "Penalty"
Before beginning the analysis of the treatment given the
Griffin doctrine of penalizing the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege in Agnellino, it is necessary to explore the asserted
distinction between the "penalty" which results from use of a defendant's silence to impeach his trial testimony and the "penalty"
which flows from its use as evidence of guilt. The distinction is
central to the Third Circuit's analysis and, under the most recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the penalty doctrine, to any
proposed resolution of the impeachment use question. Few
courts, however, have been willing to grapple with the implications of the distinction.
In Johnson v. Patterson,62 the Tenth Circuit relied upon the
holding of Griffin, and upon its logical extension in prior cases
forbidding guilt use of post-arrest silence in the case of a nontestifying defendant, to disallow impeachment use of that silence
against a defendant who does testify at his trial. The court dismissed the government's attempted distinction between the two
different uses with only a brief statement: "This distinction is
not well taken. A penalty is levied on the exercise of his constitutional right in any event, and the jury may as easily draw
prejudicial inferences. ' 63 This statement obviously glosses over
the crucial questions whether all "penalties" are per se impermissible and whether, if not, there is a sufficient difference in
the nature of the penalties involved in the two uses to justify
different results. Courts which have been faced with the impeachment use question have not, as a general rule, given any
64
serious attention to these questions.
62475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
63
/d.at 1068.
" The exception is Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1969),
where the court recognized that the "penalty" imposed by impeachment use of silence upon arrest differs from the "penalty" of guilt use enunciated in Griffin. The
court concluded that the differences did not warrant a difference in result, however,
and held the impeachment use unconstitutional as an impermissible penalty upon
the exercise of the privilege. The Fowle court, though, did not have the benefit of the
subsequent Supreme Court cases refining the penalty doctrine upon which Judge
Hunter relied in Agnellino to reach the contrary result. See text accompanying notes
67-71, 84-87 infra. In United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted
sub nora.United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 616 (1974) (No. 74-364), the most recent
case to consider the issue, the court held impermissible impeachment use of silence
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It is important, however, to determine the precise nature
of the penalty placed upon the exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege by impeachment use of post-arrest silence, and to
compare this penalty with that flowing from its use as substantive evidence of guilt. The penalty can be viewed from two perspectives. First, at the time the defendant is warned of his right
to remain silent, the burden of impeachment use of silence is
that the defendant must consider the possible effect of his silence
upon the jury if, at a later trial, he should elect to take the stand.
This burdens defendant's decision whether to assert the privilege. Second, if the defendant actually takes the stand to testify,
the penalty is that the jury will learn of his prior assertion of
the fifth amendment and will be urged to infer noncredibility of
the "inconsistent" trial testimony. Cases which have permitted
impeachment use of silence upon arrest tend to rely upon the
former description of the penalty and to minimize its significance,6 5 while cases prohibiting the impeachment rely upon the
latter description and note its prejudicial effect.6 6 It should be
apparent, however, that the impeachment use penalty must

without considering the distinction between the nature of the penalties imposed by
impeachment use and guilt use of silence. The penalty rationale, however, was not
the principal ground of the opinion. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
This tendency of the early cases to proscribe impeachment use as a discerned
penalty without further inquiry into the nature of the penalty and the differences
in justifications advanced for the different penalties is understandable in light of
the broad language in which the penalty doctrine was articulated in Griffin and cases
following closely thereafter. In holding, for example, that an attorney's disbarment,
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), and a policeman's discharge, Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), for having asserted the fifth amendment are impermissible penalities upon the exercise of the privilege, the Court defined the impermissible penalty as "the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly.'" Spevack v. Klein, supra at 515. In another line
of cases, the Court held impermissible a statutory scheme permitting avoidance of the
death penalty by a guilty plea waiving jury trial, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968), and a procedure permitting use at trial of a defendant's testimony at a
pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968). In the former case the Court defined the gravamen of the penalty as "not that
it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages
them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive -in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right." United
States v. Jackson, supra at 583. Under the early cases, virtually any practice which
constituted a discernible burden would be held unconstitutional; further inquiry
was unnecessary.
11Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 723-25 (3d Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).
66
Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 878 (1973).

956

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:940

be considered from both perspectives in evaluating its full impact upon the assertion of the privilege.
In contrast to the penalty involved in impeachment use,
considered from both perspectives, is the penalty involved in
the guilt use cases, which are more nearly analogous to Griffin.
In these cases the "penalty" consists of urging guilt from the
assertion of the privilege, which can be done whether the defendant testifies or not. The former case, by contrast, involved
the analytically distinct and arguably lesser penalty of urging
noncredibility of the defendant's testimony, a penalty which
could be imposed only if the defendant decided to testify at
the trial. These distinctions suggest that a more profound analysis than that provided by the Tenth Circuit is necessary before
one may conclude that the same result should obtain in both
cases.
B. The Agnellino Interpretationof Griffin
The principal opinion in Agnellino was written by Judge
Hunter. He began his analysis of the fifth amendment penalty
doctrine by recognizing that recent decisions of the Supreme
Court have significantly refined and limited the broad language
in which the doctrine was first articulated. He relied principally
on McGautha v. California6 7 for the proposition that "not all
'burdens' or 'fetters' on a defendant's choice arise to the level
of an unconstitutional penalty. '68 In McGautha, the defendant
Crampton argued that the Ohio procedure providing for a
single trial at which both guilt and punishment were determined
by a single jury was an impermissible penalty upon his privilege
against self-incrimination, since he could not take the stand to
testify in mitigation of punishment without incurring the risk
of damaging his case on the issue of guilt. The Supreme Court
indicated that it would consider a penalty impermissible only if
67 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
68 493 F.2d at 723. As early as United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the
Court had provided the basis for limiting the penalty doctrine by stating that the
penalty there involved was impermissible because it "needlessly penaliz[ed]" the exercise of a constitutional right. Id. at 583. By implication, some procedures which
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, although not "needlessly," might be
allowed to stand. It has been correctly argued that this was a test of "strict necessity"
which would uphold a state procedure which penalized the assertion of a constitutional
right only if that procedure were absolutely essential to the state's system of criminal
justice. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 45-46 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It is clear, however, that recent cases have adopted a far less stringent test. See text
accompanying notes 81-87 infra.
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"compelling the election [between incurring the penalty and
foregoing the right] impairs to an appreciable extent any of
the policies behind the rights involved." 69 After examining
certain "penalties" which had never been thought impermissible, 70 the Court concluded that "the policies of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a
defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to testify on
the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on
guilt."'7 ' The Court thereby indicated that the imposition per se
of a burden or penalty does not render a practice unconstitutional; inquiry must be made into the effect of the asserted penalty upon the underlying rights involved.
In attempting to make this inquiry, Judge Hunter contrasted
the penalty arising from impeachment use of a defendant's
silence upon arrest with the penalty held impermissible in Brooks
v. Tennessee. 72 In Brooks, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction obtained under a Tennessee procedure which required a
defendant who desired to testify to do so before any other testimony for the defense was heard. The "penalty" for failure to
testify first was the prohibition against testifying later in the trial.
Judge Hunter found significantly less impairment of the policies
underlying the fifth amendment in Agnellino than in Brooks:
First, the "penalty" imposed on appellant was much
less severe than that imposed by the Tennessee statute
in Brooks. Instead of losing his right to testify at a future time, appellant was merely subjected to the "traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process."
Second, unlike Brooks, this lesser "penalty" was not a
consequence of appellant's decision to remain silent;
the penalty arose only because the defendant took the
stand. 73
69 402 U.S. at 213.
70The allowable "penalties" to which the Court referred are: (1) disallowing a
defendant who takes the stand to assert the privilege against cross-examination
reasonably related to the scope of direct examination; (2) permitting a defendant
who takes the stand to be impeached by proof of prior convictions; (3) requiring
a defendant whose motion for acquittal at the close of prosecution's evidence is denied to decide whether to stand on his motion or put on a defense, knowing that
by putting on the defense he may provide additional support for a guilty verdict;
and (4) requiring a defendant to give notice of his alibi defense to the state before
trial upon pain of not being able to assert it at trial if he fails to give notice. Id. at 215-16.
71 Id. at 217.
72406 U.S. 605 (1972).
71 493 F.2d at 724 (footnote omitted). Although the second argument relied upon
by Judge Hunter is not, in itself, a satisfactory answer to the penalty argument,
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Thus, applying the policy impairment test of McGautha, Judge
Hunter concluded that the nature of the penalty in the impeachment use case is sufficiently different from that involved in
Griffin that permitting the practice would not seriously impair
the policies underlying the fifth amendment.
Judge Hunter's analysis of the penalty doctrine as a barrier
to impeaching the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony
by proof of silence upon arrest involves two aspects not present
in the earlier court of appeals cases. The first is his perception
of the difference in the nature of the penalty involved in impeachment use of the post-arrest silence from that involved in
guilt use. The second is his recognition that the penalty doctrine,
as viewed by a Supreme Court less solicitous than it once was
of the rights of the accused when balanced against legitimate
societal interests, is not a barrier of absolute impenetrability.
Although Judge Hunter felt impelled, because of these perceptions, to hold the impeachment use of post-arrest silence permissible, two basic lines of argument can be advanced to oppose
his result. First, it can be argued that, even accepting the relaxation of the penalty doctrine implicit in the policy impairment
test of McGautha, allowing impeachment use of silence upon
arrest would, contrary to Judge Hunter's conclusion, impair
the policies underlying the fifth amendment privilege. Second,
it can be argued that the emphasis of the policy impairment
test has been modified by a subsequent Supreme Court decision 74 which Judge Hunter failed to take into account and which
should have led to a different result in Agnellino. It is difficult
to see, however, how a convincing argument can be based upon
the former line of reasoning.
In his concurring opinion inAgnellino, Chief Judge Seitz took
issue with the first contention, arguing that impeachment use of
post-arrest silence would impair the policies underlying the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He drew a
contrast between the exclusionary rule of Miranda, which he
found to admit of a logical exception for impeachment purposes,
and the rationale prohibiting use of an assertion of the privilege
to infer guilt, which, he argued, does not admit of such exception. He posited that under current analysis the fifth and fours'e note 36 supra, it is appropriate here, as it bears upon whether, under the McGautha

penalty analysis, permitting impeachment use of silence upon arrest would impair
the compulsion policies of the fifth amendment.
" Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). See text accompanying notes
84-88 infra.
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teenth amendments comprise three related prohibitions: First,
involuntary statements of an accused are excluded for all purposes; second, silence cannot be urged to infer guilt; and third,
if an accused makes a voluntary statement without knowledge of
his rights, it is excluded from use as direct, but not as impeachment evidence.7 5 The third prohibition, he argued, is different
"in type" from the first two. The Miranda rule is a "prophylactic
measure" which, in its prohibition of direct use of a statement
obtained without the required warnings, protects both innocent defendants who, in ignorance of their rights, make a statement which is subject to inculpatory construction, and guilty
defendants who know what their rights are. Impeachment use
of voluntary but unconstitutional statements is merely an exception to the prophylactic rule, Chief Judge Seitz argued, not to
the fifth amendment itself, and is justified as a "deterrent to
intentional dishonesty by defendants."
The protection against use of silence to infer guilt,
like the protection against use of coerced statements,
has not given rise to any prophylactic rule such as Miranda lays down. To say that a defendant's silence in the
face of accusation can be used to impeach his testimony would
have the same effect as allowing impeachment use of coerced
confessions. The law has recognized that no testimonial
statement may be drawn from silence in the face of
police accusation, nor from a statement made under
duress, that is sufficiently reliable
to be admitted for
76
any purpose in a criminal trial.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. It attempts to
resolve the conflict between Griffin and Harris by a legal nicety
rather than by balancing the interests involved. Moreover, the
legal nicety adopted for the purpose has a weak legal basis. No
reason is given for equating use of arrest silence with use of an
involuntary confession, and none is readily apparent. On the
contrary, the rationale for the Griffin prohibition of an inference
of guilt from silence corresponds more closely to the rationale
of the Miranda exclusionary rule than to that of the cases prohibiting all use of involuntary confessions. 77 The Griffin dissent
pointed out that the Court's decision went beyond the tradi7', 493 F.2d at 728 (Seitz. C.J.. concurring).
76 Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
7 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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tional "compulsion" rationale of the involuntary confession
cases, and commentators have elaborated upon that departure.7 8 Indeed, in a subsequent case the Supreme Court characterized the basic purpose of the Griffin rule as being "to discourage courts from penalizing use of the privilege against
self-incrimination. '7 9 The rule against drawing an inference of
guilt from a defendant's silence, like the prophylactic Miranda
rule, is one step removed from the traditional concern of the
fifth amendment that testimony not be compelled. And it must
be admitted that impeachmert use of post-arrest silence is yet
another half-step removed from those concerns. Both rules
thus serve policies ancillary to those underlying the fifth amendment itself. If, as Chief Judge Seitz concedes, the Miranda rule
can be excepted for impeachment purposes without impairing
the policies of the fifth amendment, so, likewise, can the Grif80
fin rationale.
A more satisfying basis upon which to resolve the GriffinHarris conflict is to examine the "policy impairment" test itself
and the treatment it has received in later decisions. As articulated
in MeGautha, that test holds that a procedure which imposes a
discernible burden upon the exercise of fifth amendment rights
will not be declared an impermissible penalty unless it "impairs
to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights
involved." 8 1 This formulation of the penalty doctrine has been
criticized as not requiring the state to show a strong interest in
the procedure which constitutes the burden and as permitting
the Court to base its result on "dubious determinations of policy
impairment. ' 83 The recent decision in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe8 4
indicates that although the Court is not willing to return to the
broad language of the early penalty cases, which would invalidate per se all procedures which impose a perceptible burden
upon the exercise of a constitutional right, it will require some
78 See authorities cited note 14 supra.

79Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966).
80A recent decision clearly indicates that a majority of the Court is now inclined
to return to the traditional compulsion analysis in approaching the fifth amendment
claims and to view departures from, for example, the Miranda rule, as something less
than constitutional violations. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439-46 (1974). The
Court's reasoning in that case, indeed its very language, could as well be directed
against the Griffin doctrine, especially as it is sought to be extended to bar impeachment use of arrest silence.
81 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
82 See note 68 supra.
83
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 291 (1971).
84 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
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showing of a legitimate state interest in the procedure before
declaring it a permissible burden.
In Chaffin, the Court was presented with a state practice
which created the possibility that a jury retrying a defendant
after his successful appeal or collateral attack upon a conviction
could impose a harsher sentence than had the original jury.
The Court held that this possibility did not impermissibly burden a defendant's right to challenge his conviction.8 5 The Court
declared that if a state has a legitimate interest in a procedure,
it will not be struck down merely because an "incidental consequence" of the procedure is that it burdens, to a less than substantial extent, the exercise of a constitutional right.86 If, however,
"the only objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion
of constitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' "87
Although this articulation drew a strong dissent,8 8 it does
seem to place at least some limitation upon the broad policy impairment test enunciated in McGautha and upon which Judge
Hunter relied in Agnellino. Judge Hunter did not discuss the
Chaffin limitation in his penalty analysis; yet it obviously weakens
the persuasiveness of that analysis. He argued that impeachment
use of post-arrest silence, although constituting a "penalty" upon
the exercise of the privilege, does not significantly impair the
traditional compulsion concerns of the fifth amendment. But
Chaffin requires more. No penalty should be tolerated without
a demonstration that the "penalty" is justified by a legitimate
state interest which is materially advanced by the imposition
of the burden. The analysis in the following section of the Comment will demonstrate that as an evidentiary matter, the asserted
state interest in truthfulness is not materially advanced by permitting impeachment use of post-arrest silence. That being
so, the penalty should be declared impermissible under the
Chaffin formulation of the penalty doctrine.
15In developing its penalty analysis, the Court relied freely upon cases in which
the penalty was upon the exercise of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights.
Thus, the fact that Chaffin dealt with a penalty upon the right to appeal does not
mean that the penalty analysis enunciated therein has no application beyond the
limited scope of the right to appeal.
86412 U.S. at 32 & n.20.
87Id. (citation omitted).
88Justice Marshall, joined in his reasoning by Justices Douglas and Stewart. who
each wrote a separate dissent, argued that cases subsequent to Jackson had not changed
the penalty standard and that "[t]he question is still whether the burden on the exercise of the right ... is necessary, not whether it is only incidental to the accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose." Id. at 44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Finding
no "necessity" in the rule permitting a jury to impose a harsher sentence on retrial,
Justice Marshall would have reversed Chaffin's conviction.
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THE HARRIS IMPEACHMENT RATIONALE AS A BASIS
FOR IMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE UPON ARREST

A. The Basis of the Harris Rationale
The analysis in the previous section revealed that the doctrine of penalizing the exercise of a constitutional right, which
has been advanced to oppose impeachment use of post-arrest
silence, has now been cast in a form which would arguably permit
that use if the procedure serves a legitimate state interest, despite an incidental burden on the exercise of the right to remain
silent.8 9 Accordingly, the focus of the inquiry shifts to whether
the opportunity to impeach testimonial evidence is such a legitimate state interest and, if so, whether use of post-arrest silence
to impeach would materially advance that interest.
The first question does not require extended discussion.
The right to impeach the testimony of an opponent's witness
is considered fundamental to our adversary system of justice.
The necessity for the impeachment right inheres in the nature
of testimonial proof 90 and provides much of the justification for
the venerable common law institution of cross-examination. 91
A vast body of law has developed defining the scope of the impeachment right 92 and the means which may properly be used
to impeach. 93 It is clear that the right to impeach extends to a
criminal defendant who chooses to take the stand. 94 And the
impeachment right has been recognized in several contexts even
when countervailing constitutional issues were raised. Thus, despite the possible prejudice to a defendant's fair trial, his prior
valid convictions may be shown to impeach his credibility,9 5 and
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, as well as evidence
89 See text accompanying notes 67-69, 84-87 supra.

" When a witness testifies at trial, his assertion that fact X exists is the only
evidential fact before the trier. The trier is asked to infer from the witness' assertion
that fact X does, indeed, exist. The process of impeachment permits an opponent to
question the cogency of this inference by attempting to explain away the evidential
fact of the witness' assertion by an hypothesis other than the existence of fact X. See
3A J. WicioRE, EVIDENCE § 22, at 636-41 (Chadbourne rev. 1970).
91 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 22, at 49.
92 See 3A J. WIGMIORE, supra note 90, §§ 884-918.
3
See id. §§ 920-1046, at 723-1065.
.14 See id. §§ 890-91, at 654-57.
' Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-62 (1967); cf. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473
(1972) (plurality holding impeachment by a prior conviction obtained in contravention of a defendant's right to counsel violative of due process; Justice White, concurring in the result, would only have the court of appeals determine certain issues
on remand to elucidate whether there was harmless error).

1975]

IMPEACHING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY

obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, may be used to
impeach. 96 These precedents in the constitutional area, coupled
with the deeply rooted tradition favoring the opportunity to
impeach testimonial evidence, suggest that the Court might not
hestitate to find, in a clash between the impeachment right and
the recent articulation of the penalty doctrine, that impeachment
of a defendant's testimony-the interest of the judicial system
in getting at "truth"-is a legitimate state interest which, if subserved by use of post-arrest silence to impeach, will prevail over
the incidental "penalty" which may result. The asserted interest
here is clearly stronger than the state's interest in permitting a
jury to impose a harsher sentence upon retrial following reversal,
which was held to justify the burden upon the right to appeal
97
in Chaffin.
The second question, whether impeachment use of postarrest silence would materially advance this legitimate interest
in testing the truthfulness and accuracy of a defendant's testimony, is much more problematical and has been the principal
point upon which the courts of appeals have disagreed in the
impeachment use cases. Here the inquiry must begin with Harris,
for it is the basis for the Third and Fifth Circuits' holdings permitting impeachment use. The impeachment exception to the
Miranda exclusionary rule articulated by the Supreme Court in
Harris is based upon the longstanding principle of the law of
evidence that a witness may be impeached by the showing of a
prior inconsistent statement. 98 The key word here is obviously
"inconsistent," for if the prior statement is not inconsistent with
the trial testimony, the theoretical basis for its impeachment
use vanishes. In Harris, the Court acknowledged that the defendant's prior statement "contrasted sharply" with his trial
testimony, and thus "undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the
jury in assessing [his] credibility . . -99 Although the Harris
rationale cannot be applied to statements which are not inconsistent with the defendant's trial testimony, 10 0 the courts have
96 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954); see text accompanying notes 17-25 supra. See also Comment, The Impeachment
Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 73 CoLu,. L. REv. 1476 (1973); 34
U. Cm. L. REV. 939 (1967).
117
See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 45-46 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 3AJ. WIGNIORE, supra note 90, §§ 10 17-46.

99Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
' Cf. United States ex rel. Wright v. La Vallee, 471 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
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not defined the degree of inconsistency required to render
impeachment use of the prior statement permissible. 10 '
When the problem changes from determining the inconsistency of two statements to determining the inconsistency of
trial testimony with prior silence, however, the difficulties are
multiplied. Rather than explain why silence upon arrest is or is
not inconsistent with testimony at trial, courts on both sides of the
issue have simply asserted a position, virtually a priori, based
on the facts of the particular case. For example, the Fifth Circuit just assumed Ramirez's silence upon arrest was a "prior
inconsistent act.' 1 0 2 Two of the three judges sitting on the Third
Circuit panel in Burt merely asserted that the defendant's silence
was "inconsistent with his testimony at trial that the shooting
was accidental.' 0 3 Nor did the Tenth Circuit, in disallowing
impeachment use of silence, shed any light upon the problem
of determining inconsistency; it noted only that "[t]he premise
of Ramirez is that silence at [the] time of arrest is an act inconsistent with the testimony given at trial. We simply deny the
validity of the premise."' 0 4 The only in-depth discussion of the
problem of the inconsistency of arrest silence with later testimony at trial, and hence of the probative value of that silence
upon the issue of credibility, is in Judge Hunter's Agnellino opinion. And it is submitted that his analysis of this aspect of the question is not compelling.
The Application of the Impeachment
Rationale in Agnellino
In approaching the question of the legitimacy of using a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach his testimonial credibility at trial, Judge Hunter relied upon two Supreme Court
decisions which dealt with a similar problem in different contexts. In Raffel v. United States,'0 5 the Court allowed cross-examination of the defendant which disclosed that on a previous trial
for the same offense, he had not taken the stand to deny testiB.

101Cf. 3A

J.

WNIGIORE, supra note 90, § 1040, at 1048-52 (setting forth varying

standards defining the degree of inconsistency required at common law to permit
impeachment of a witness by prior statement).
'02 United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971).
13 United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234, 238 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn,
J.. concurring), cell. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).

'Johnson

v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 n.3 (10th Cir.) (citation omitted),

cell.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
"".271 U.S. 494 (1926).

1975]

IMPEACHING DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY

mony similar to that which he had denied at the instant trial.
Because of the posture of the case, however, the question of the
probative value of the prior silence upon Raffel's credibility at
the second trial was not resolved.' 0 6 Some thirty years later, the
Court decided Grunewald v. United States. 10 7 The defendant Halperin had previously been called before a federal grand jury
investigating corruption in the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
there he asserted the fifth amendment in response to questions
concerning his relationship with Grunewald. At trial, he responded to similar questions in a manner consistent with his
innocence, and the trial court allowed the prosecutor to bring
out on cross-examination that when testifying before the grand
jury, he had asserted his privilege in response to the same questions. Although reversing, the Court expressly declined to overrule Raffel.' 0 8 Instead, it merely declared that Raffel had not
established as a matter of law that prior silence "is always to be
deemed to be a prior inconsistent statement, irrespective of the
09
circumstances under which the claim of privilege was made."'
Exercising its supervisory power over the federal courts, the
Supreme Court required that before impeachment use can be
made of a prior assertion of the privilege, the trial court must
satisfy itself by an examination of the circumstances that an inconsistency in fact exists. After a detailed examination of the
particular circumstances before the grand jury,"10 the Court
106 Raffel came to the Court as a certified question from the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The question certified was: "Was it error to require
the defendant, Raffel, offering himself as a witness upon the second trial, to disclose
that he had not testified as a witness in his own behalf upon the first trial." Id. at 496.
The Court in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), said that the Raffel
Court had not focused on the probative value of the silence because the question as it
came to the Court had been "in quite an abstract form." Id. at 420.
107

10

353 U.S. 391 (1957).

8Id. at 419-21. Justice Black, concurring, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Brennan and Douglas, argued that Raffel should be explicitly overruled. Id.
at 426-27 (Black, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 419-20.
110 The circumstances of the case which the Court relied upon in holding that no
inconsistency sufficient to permit impeachment use of Halperin's assertion of the
privilege existed were: (1) the charge of conspiracy, which by its nature increases
the dangers of unwitting self-incrimination; (2) defendant's insistence before the
grand jury that he was innocent and was asserting the privilege only on advice of
counsel; (3) the nature of a grand jury proceeding, where defendant was compelled
by subpoena to testify and did not have the right to counsel or other procedural
safeguards available in an open court proceeding; and (4) defendant's knowledge
that he was about to be indicted and his desire to refuse to help create a case against
himself. These factors, the Court held, rendered defendant's silence before the
grand jury "wholly consistent" with his trial testimony. Id. at 421-24.
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held that there was not such an inconsistency between his silence
and his later testimony as to allow impeachment of the testimony
by proof of the prior silence.
Relying upon the Court's apparent sanctioning of impeachment use of an assertion of the privilege in Raffel and upon its
failure to rest Grunewald upon the fifth amendment, Judge
Hunter concluded that "the Court impliedly recognized that
evidence of silence is subject to ambiguous inferences which may
diminish its reliability, yet only where one's prior silence is quite
clearly consistent with innocence, and thus void of any probative
value, [does] this evidentiary question [arise] to constitutional
[due process] dimensions."'' Comparing the facts of Agnellino's
silence with those in Grunewald, where Halperin knew he was
about to be indicted and was before a grand jury where he did
not have the right to counsel, Judge Hunter concluded that
the particular circumstances which made Halperin's silence not
inconsistent with his trial testimony were lacking in Agnellino.
Viewing Agnellino's silence upon arrest as inconsistent with
his testimony at trial, Judge Hunter concluded that due process
was not denied by permitting use of the silence to impeach that
testimony. He read Harris as "consistent with and supportive
of Raffel and Grunewald,"1 12 and found that the prior silence,
because of its inconsistency with the trial testimony, met the
Harris requirement that the "trustworthiness" of the impeaching evidence " 'satisf[y] legal standards.' "113
Judge Hunter's analysis of the penalty doctrine's applicability
to impeachment by post-arrest silence decidedly reflects the
current trend in Supreme Court analysis of that doctrine, and
thus raises significant questions which courts did not deal with
adequately in the previous cases involving impeachment use of
silence. But the reasoning which led him to conclude that silence
is probative of credibility, and should therefore be permitted,
is highly questionable. A close examination discloses that even
as a matter of sound impeachment theory, use of silence to impeach trial testimony does not advance the asserted state interest in arriving at "truth." The Chaffin test is therefore not
met, and the burden on the defendant's right to remain silent
is an impermissible one. Judge Hunter's legal analysis of the
strict impeachment aspect of the issue resolves itself into two

11493

F.2d at 720 (footnote omitted).
112 Id. at 721.
3
"
Id. (quoting 401 U.S. at 224).
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propositions: First, that one's assertion of the fifth amendment
upon arrest can be probative of the credibility of trial testimony;
and second, that the determination whether silence has probative value must be made on a case-by-case basis.1 14 These propositions must be scrutinized to determine whether they are in
fact established by the authorities upon which Judge Hunter
relied, and whether they constitute a sound and defensible resolution of the impeachment use question.
For these propositions Judge Hunter relied upon Raffel v.
United States," 5 which permitted cross-examination regarding a
prior assertion of the privilege, and upon Grunewald v. United
States,' 6 where the Supreme Court refused to hold that silence
can never have probative value, basing its disallowance of the
impeachment upon the failure of the particular circumstances
of the case to show any inconsistency between the trial testimony and the prior silence." 7 It is doubtful, however, whether
Raffel and Grunewald should be read to have held that silence
can be of sufficient probative value to permit its use to impeach.
In Grunewald the Court specifically acknowledged that "[t]he
Court, in Raffel, did not focus on the question whether the cross114 Having concluded that use of post-arrest silence to impeach does not constitute
an impermissible penalty upon the exercise of the right to remain silent, see text
accompanying notes 72-73 supra, Judge Hunter also held that the probative value of
an assertion of the right to remain silent is simply an evidentiary question not assuming constitutional proportions unless, under the particular circumstances, the
silence is so void of probative value that its use would violate due process. Text accompanying note 111 supra. In so holding he relied upon Raffel, which permitted crossexamination regarding a prior assertion of the privilege, and upon the Court's
having rested its Grunewald decision, which disallowed cross-examination regarding
a prior assertion of the privilege, upon its supervisory power rather than upon the
fifth amendment. Although both Raffel and Grunewald were decided prior to the
Court's adoption of the penalty doctrine as an adjunct to the fifth amendment, the
Grunewald majority recognized that its decision had "grave constitutional overtones."
353 U.S. at 423. As subsequent penalty analysis has developed, the question whether
post-arrest silence is probative of credibility will determine whether impeachment
use of that silence is a permissible penalty; for if it is not probative, then no legitimate
state interest is served by allowing its use as impeaching evidence, and its use would
be an impermissible penalty under the Chaffin formulation. Thus, Judge Hunter's
failure to discuss the Chaffin limitation, which tainted his conclusion on the penalty
issue, see text accompanying note 88 supra, also renders suspect his conclusion that
impeachment use of post-arrest silence is not a constitutional question unless the
silence in a given case is so void of probative value as to violate due process. The
probative value determination is an integral part of the determination whether a constitutionally impermissible penalty has been imposed.
115271 U.S. 494 (1926).
116 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
117Substantially the same use of Raffel and Grunewald was made by Judge Breitenstein in Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1666 (10th Cir.) (Breitenstein, J., dissenting),
cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
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examination involved was in fact probative in impeaching the
defendant's credibility."1 " And the Grunewald holding itself
was that Halperin's assertion of the fifth amendment before
the grand jury was not sufficiently inconsistent with his testimony
at trial to permit its impeachment use. Moreover, four members
of the Court would have broadened the holding:
I agree with the Court that use of this claim of constitutional privilege to reflect upon Halprin's credibility
was error, but I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the special circumstances of this case. I can
think of no special circumstances that would justify use
of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a
person who asserts it.119
Thus, to say that the Court has held that the assertion of the
privilege can be probative of credibility is to stretch substantially
what the cases have held. The only support to be found for this
proposition is by negative implication from the approach taken
by the Court in Grunewald-impeachment use of an assertion
of the privilege is impermissible under these circumstances,
so there are other circumstances under which it would be permissible. This is by no means a necessary inference.
Precedential support is thus lacking for the proposition that
assertion of the privilege can be probative of credibility. The
question must therefore be dealt with on its own merits. If use
of an assertion of the fifth amendment is to be justified upon
the impeachment rationale, consideration must be given not
only to the probative value of that silence but also to other policies which form an integral part of impeachment theory and
which may supervene to exclude from impeachment use even
evidence otherwise probati- e of credibility.
If one were to concede that silence upon arrest can in some
circumstances be probative of the credibility of a defendant's
trial testimony, the approach requiring a case-by-case determina20
tion of inconsistency would have a surface logical appeal.
Such an approach would be clearly preferable to a rule which
would permit impeachment use of silence in all cases without
118 353 U.S. at 420.

Id. at 425 (Black, J., concurring).
It has been noted, in the context of the inconsistency of a prior statement with
testimony at trial, that "[i]n most rulings, the circumstances of the cases are individual,
and they have no value as precedents." 3A J. WIGNMORE, supra note 90, § 1040, at 1049.
The same would hold true in the silence situation, if its use to impeach is sanctioned at
all.
120
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an inquiry into inconsistency under the particular circumstances
of the case. 12 1 The inference of inconsistency between trial testimony and prior silence may, indeed, be stronger in some circumstances than in others.122 But the underlying question is whether
silence is ever, even in the cases in which the inference is arguably stronger, sufficiently probative of credibility that its use
should be permitted.
In answering this question, one must look to the theoretical
basis for impeachment of this type. Impeachment by showing a
prior inconsistent statement, which is the type approved in Harris
and the type sought to be extended to silence upon arrest, is
essentially an empirical process. A prior statement inconsistent
with one aspect of a witness' trial testimony is shown, and the
trier of fact is asked to infer from this specific error that the
witness' other assertions may also be erroneous. Casting the pro23
posed course of empirical impeachment in deductive form
highlights its lack of probative value. The syllogism would be:
When arrested for a crime, a person who truly has an
alibi or defense will protest his innocence and assert the
alibi or defense.
This defendant did not, upon arrest, assert the alibi
or defense to which he is now testifying.
Therefore, this defendant's testimony in support of
that alibi or defense is untrue.
As a general principle describing human behavior, the validity
of the major premise is open to serious question. The fear, hos121 The Fifth Circuit, in a case following Ramirez, has apparently adopted such an

approach. In United States v. Quintana-Gomez, 488 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1974),
the court held an impeachment use of silence claim "to be foreclosed by" Ramirez
despite circumstances arguably negating any inconsistency between trial testimony and
post-arrest silence: None of the arresting officers spoke Spanish, and apparently, the
defendant did not speak English. Id. at 1248.
122In Agnellino, for example, the defendant made certain statements but remained
silent as to the details to which he testified at trial. These circumstances, it could be
argued, permit a more certain inference of inconsistency and hence of probative
value, than the facts of Ramirez or Johnson. A similar argument can be made on the
Burt facts in that the defendant there remained silent concerning an occurrence other
than that for which he was arrested. This would give rise to an inference of inconsistency undiminished by the possible alternative explanation that the defendant was
asserting his privilege in response to police accusation. See Agnellino v. New Jersey,
493 F.2d 714, 728-29 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
123 Professor Wigmore suggested the use of the deductive form to assess the
force of a proposed course of empirical impeachment. 3A J. WiGIORE, supra note 90,
§ 874, at 638-40.
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tility, and disorientation attendant upon an arrest may well
lead an accused not to cooperate. But more than this, in every
case the defendant is told, when arrested, that he has a right to
remain silent and that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court. Through the warning delivered by the
police officer, the state has placed its weight in favor of the defendant's remaining silent. His silence can always be explained
as an exercise of the privilege. The availability of this alternate
explanation, coupled with the state's assurance to the defendant
that he may do so, completely strips the major premise of any
validity as a general principle upon which to base impeachment
use of post-arrest silence. For if there is an explanation for the
asserted inconsistency other than that the trial testimony is untrue, which is the inference the prosecutor urges, the probative
value of the silence upon the issue of credibility disappears, and
its use to impeach cannot be justified.
Apart from the probative value of evidence sought to be
used for impeachment purposes, the law has traditionally recognized auxiliary policies which may require exclusion of evidence from impeachment use even though it would be probative
of credibility. Thus, in the case of prior inconsistent statements
used to impeach, the auxiliary policies of avoiding confusion
of issues and unfair surprise have resulted in the exclusion of
impeachment evidence on matters collateral to the main issues of
the trial 124 and required that a witness be asked in advance whether he made the prior statement before the self-contradiction
can be proved.1 25 Also, the general principle excluding evidence
whose probative value is outweighed by potential prejudice to
the party against whom it is offered applies not only to evidence
offered for substantive purposes, but also to that offered for
impeachment. 126
Two considerations of auxiliary policy, in addition to the
lack of probative value of the silence, require the exclusion of
post-arrest silence as impeaching evidence. The first is the unavoidable difficulty of determining whether prior silence in
a particular case is inconsistent with trial testimony. When there
is a prior statement, a standard of inconsistency can be developed
and applied against that statement. In the case of prior silence,
however, there is nothing specific against which to apply the

124
Id.
25

1 Id.

§§ 1020-23.
§§ 1025-39.

126 FED.

R. EVID. 403; C.

MCCORMICK,

supra note 14, § 185, at 438-39.
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standard-only silence. This dilemma is doubtless responsible
for the lack of a convincing demonstration in either Ramirez 127
or
Burt of how the silence was inconsistent with the trial testimony.
Indeed, in Agnellino, Judge Hunter did not attempt to demonstrate how Agnellino's silence upon arrest was inconsistent with
his trial testimony. He merely rested his determination of probative value upon the fact that the circumstances of Grunewald,
where the Court held silence to have no probative value, were dif28
ferent in several respects from the circumstances of Agnellino.1
Moreover, adoption of the case-by-case approach suggested
by Judge Hunter would permit trial courts to use varying standards in making the inconsistency determination. The possible
variation in standards is significant, ranging from the view of
one court that silence upon arrest is inconsistent only with a de129
fendant's assertion that he did make a statement upon arrest,
to the view of another court that anything said at trial is "inconsistent" with prior silence.' 30 One standard might require
that the judge make an initial determination that the offered
silence is necessarily inconsistent with the trial testimony before
allowing the prosecutor to use it for impeachment purposes,
while another would permit the judge to allow impeachment
if a jury could reasonably infer inconsistency between the prior
silence and the trial testimony.1 31 Similarly, the degree of inconsistency deemed necessary to permit impeachment use could
See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
The differences Judge Hunter perceived are these:
Appellant was not denied assistance of counsel; indeed he chose not to seek
counsel. Nor were the appellant's replies restricted by the scope of the questions asked; he was free to fully explain answers which initially might have
appeared superficially incriminating. Lastly, I do not think that appellant's
statements at trial-if in fact made by appellant at the time of arrest-could
have been erroneously construed by the police as inculpating appellant. Thus,
I do not believe we are faced with a Grunewald-type situation.
493 F.2d at 721; cf. notes 45. 110 supra.
121,People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355. 359, 212 N.W.2d 190. 192 (1973).
130 This is how the Tenth Circuit. in a case following Johnson, characterized the
rule approved in Ramhrez. Deats v. Rodriguez. 477 F.2d 1023. 1024 (10th Cir. 1973). A
subsequent case in the Fifth Circuit indicates that that court actually may have taken
a position as broad as the interpretation sarcastically placed upon its Ramirez decision
by the Tenth Circuit in Deats. United States v. Quintana-Gomez. 488 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.
1974); see note 121 supra.
3 judge Wilkey. dissenting in United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038. 1046
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub norn. United States v. Hale. 95 S. Ct. 616 (1974) (No.
74-364), while favoring impeachment use of post-arrest silence, conceded that before
it can logically be used to impeach trial testimony, the silence must be "inconsistent"
with that testimony. He would apparently admit proof of post-arrest silence as impeaching evidence if it is "arguably inconsistent with an innocent explanation." Id.
at 1052 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
227
228
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vary from the requirement of a "direct contradiction" to that
of only a "material variance" between the silence and the testimony. 13 2 Thus, the difficulty of making the determination of
inconsistency in the case of post-arrest silence, when compared
with the alternate explanation available in every case and the
necessarily minimal probative value, strongly suggests adoption
of a per se rule prohibiting impeachment use of silence upon
arrest.
The second consideration of auxiliary policy arising from
use of silence upon arrest to impeach trial testimony is the degree of potential prejudice to the defendant resulting from that
practice. The danger always exists, in any case in which evidence
is admissible only upon a single issue, that a jury will not restrict
its consideration of the evidence to the narrow issue to which
it is legally relevant.1 33 The law has attempted to deal with this
danger through devices such as giving special instructions to
the jury. This concern about impermissible use of evidence of
limited admissibility underlay the restriction established in the
Walder articulation of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule-that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can
be used to impeach only as to collateral matters. 134 For as the
unconstitutionally obtained evidence is used to impeach a defendant on matters more central to the crime charged, the danger that the jury will consider the evidence in assessing guilt
increases. Although the Court in Harris considered this distinction unimportant under the circumstances of that case,'1 35 it
becomes crucial when post-arrest silence is used to impeach
trial testomony. This is so because the cases have uniformly
held that use of silence upon arrest as substantive evidence of
guilt violates the fifth amendment' 36-a result mandated by the
holding in Griffin. The testimony which the cases have allowed
to be impeached by use of post-arrest silence, typically an alibi
or a complete defense, is central to the guilt issue. When the
jury is urged to infer noncredibility of a defendant's exculpatory
These varying standards are employed in different jurisdictions for determin-

232

ing the degree of inconsistency necessary between trial testimony and a prior statement to permit its impeachment use. C. M C(ORMICK. supra note 14. § 34. at 68-69.
33
1 Id. § 59, at 135-37; 1 J. WIGNMORE, EVIDENCE § 13, at 299-303 (3d ed. 1940);
U. KAN. L. REV. 360, 367 (1972). See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
127-28, 177-80 (1966).
'34 Walder %. United States. 347 U.S. 62. 65-66 (1954). See also 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
939. 941-44 (1967).
13"Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 222, 205 (1971).
326See cases cited note 16 supra.
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testimony as a whole, because of his prior silence, the danger
is far greater than in the case of impeachment by a prior statement that the silence, offered and legally admissible only on the
issue of credibility, will be put to the unconstitutional use by
137
the jury.
The protection offered by the law of evidence against inappropriate impeachment and resulting prejudice, other than
cautionary instructions to the jury, is the right of the party whose
witness is impeached by proof of a prior inconsistent statement
to explain away the inconsistency to the jury. 1 38 There has been
some suggestion in the impeachment use cases that this right
would give the defendant adequate protection against possible
guilt use of the impeaching silence. 13 9 It seems anomalous, however, to argue that impeachment use of silence should be allowed
and that defendants should be remitted to explaining their
silence as an assertion of the fifth amendment, when this explanation would be available in every case. And it is not clear, given
the inferences which laymen draw from an assertion of the
privilege, 140 that this would adequately ensure against a jury's
misapplication to the forbidden issue of guilt, to the defendant's
prejudice, of his silence offered and admissible only for impeachment purposes.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question whether the government should be allowed
to prove a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence in an attempt
to impeach his exculpatory trial testimony must be resolved by a
,37 In 11alder, the Court said:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity
to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements
of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to
introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore
not available for its case in chief.
347 U.S. at 65. The Court in Harris, it is true, permitted impeachment by a prior
statement wlhich went directly to the crime charged. Permitting use of a prior statement which was inconsistent with one aspect of Harris' trial testimony is quite
different from permitting impeachment use of prior silence, which, because of its
ambiguous nature, can be considered by a jury as inconsistent with the defendant's
entire trial testimony.
13"3A J. WIG.IORE, supra note 90, §§ 1044-46, at 1062-65.
" E.g., United States ex reL Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234, 238 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn,
J.. concurring). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973).
140 In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1956), Justice Frankfurter noted: "Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it
are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege."
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dual analysis. First, the impact of such a practice upon the constitutional rights of the accused, under presently accepted doctrines, must be assessed; and second, the contribution that the
practice would make to the truth-seeking process of the trial
must be ascertained. Acceptable rationales under both heads
must be articulated before the practice can be sanctioned.
Permitting impeachment use of silence places a burden upon
the exercise of a constitutional right. Under the penalty doctrine
as originally articulated, this probably would have been sufficient to proscribe the practice as violative of the Constitution.
As the doctrine has been modified in more recent decisions,
however, a legitimate state interest in a procedure which only
incidentally burdens the exercise of a constitutional right can be
held to override that burden. Because impeachment use of
silence is a penalty less severe that its use as substantive evidence
of guilt, which the courts have uniformly prohibited, a strong
argument can be made that the state's legitimate interest in ensuring the truthfulness and accuracy of trial testimony should
override the smaller burden imposed on a defendant's fifth
amendment rights by use of post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes.
The analysis cannot end there, however; the second requirement must also be satisfied. Upon this ground the use of postarrest silence to impeach cannot be justified. Neither precedent
nor independent analysis permits the conclusion that silence
upon arrest is sufficiently probative of credibility that its use
for impeachment purposes would significantly advance the asserted state interest. The theory is that the failure to assert upon
arrest a defense or alibi later testified to at trial is indicative that
the trial testimony is false. On its own merits, it is quite tenuous.
And the alternative explanation of the defendant's arrest silence-that it was an assertion of the fifth amendment--drains
that silence of all force as impeaching evidence. Moreover,
balanced against the marginal probative value of the silence are
two problems: the difficulty of making the inconsistency determination in a given case-which is the minimum constitutional
prerequisite to impeachment by a prior statement; and the degree of potential prejudice to the defendant by ajury's consideration of the silence on the issue of guilt.
The asserted state interest of truthfulness would not, therefore, be materially advanced by permitting the government to
use a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach his trial testi-
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mony. Absent this showing, the penalty concededly imposed
upon the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by
impeachment use of the silence becomes impermissible under
current penalty doctrine analysis. Thus, the courts should adopt,
contrary to the results reached in Agnellino, Burt, and Ramirez,
a per se rule prohibiting all attempts to impeach a defendant's
trial testimony by proof of his silence following arrest and Miranda warnings.

